When the anti-traditionalists love tradition

 

One of the several interesting moments in Joanna Hanink's piece 'A New Path for Classics' (which originally appeared under the title 'If Classics Doesn't Change, Let it Burn') comes when the Brown University Classics professor shifts from her critique of the field to 'a new generation of classicists' who, she says,  are turning away from the triumphalist “Western civ” model' and 'becoming better in tune with the world’s shifting realities.' 'The nation of Greece,' she goes on 

has recently been looking to allies beyond Europe. It is forging new economic and cultural links with China in a partnership based, at least rhetorically, on the idea that nations with ancient pedigrees understand each other. The same general premise also underpins the Ancient Civilizations Forum, a cultural initiative with nine member countries in regions that were “cradles of ancient civilizations.” The forum casts the antiquity as a potential source of soft power for modern nations.

There are a few points that might be raised here, from the wisdom of democratic nations cozying up to a communist dictatorship, to 'the idea that nations with ancient pedigrees understand each other.' What I want to highlight in this post, though, is the strangeness of Hanink appealing to 'nations with ancient pedigrees' at all. After all, in the rest of her article she several times casts doubt on 'the claim that ancient Greece and Rome were the “foundation of Western civilization," a 'fairytale Western origin story' that, she declares, she has 'no more patience for.' She also links approvingly to Kwame Anthony Appiah's essay 'There is no Such Thing as Western Civilization.' 

Now, admittedly, it could be the case that the narratives of continuity in Chinese history are correct (though the role of the Chinese state in constructing such narratives should give us pause), and every possible story about Western Civilization is simply false. But there is, I would submit, something quite strange, even less than perfectly consistent, about the position that some narratives of cultural continuity have to be insistently deconstructed while others can be routinely greenlighted. 

Appiah's idea that the Western tradition doesn't really exist is really only one step on from a general scepticism towards tradition that has had a place in the academy for quite some time now. The work that, as far as I can tell, planted the seed for this particular intellectual sub-tradition was Hobsbawm and Ranger's 1983 volume The Invention of Tradition, which discussed examples of traditions being more or less made up out of whole cloth, or at least reified to an extent that the actual historical facts didn't quite support. 

Hobsbawm and Ranger were no fools, and the phenomenon they pointed to was a real one. Traditions, from the Christmas Day address of the British monarch (inaugurated in in 1932) to the Superbowl (1966) are often more recent than we think. There's no doubt that some claims about tradition are more or less (sometimes entirely) mendacious, and that they often serve present-day interests and structures of power. 

But there's a risk of going too far the other way - a risk that, it seems to me, is especially perilous in contexts where the idea we're reacting to is associated with a political Other. Though some traditions - even many - may be invented, or at least patched up, we probably shouldn't conclude from this that all traditions are just made up, and there's no such thing as long-term cultural continuity at all.

One problem with arriving at this kind of conclusion is that talking about traditions and cultural lineages - even ones that reach back into ancient times - can often turn out to be very useful. Unsurprisingly, progressive historians and classicists sometimes find them useful too, as Hanink seems to in her talk of 'nations with ancient pedigrees.' And there are other examples.

Classicists who are in favour of transferring the Elgin Marbles to Greece, for example, usually do so partly on the basis that contemporary Greeks are, in some sense, the heirs (even the compatriots) of Pericles and of the classical city-states. Feminist classicists like Mary Beard are often partial to tracing a 'long tradition' of misogyny back to Greece and Rome. Somewhat further afield, Christianity is seen as having imposed repressive norms to do with gender and sexuality on cultures - in Polynesia, for example - that, it's claimed, had a tradition of more openness and flexibility in these areas of life.

My purpose here, again, isn't to contest any of these claims, or even to discuss them in any depth. At first glance, they all seem to have some plausibility. My purpose here is just to point out that strangeness. If it's true - or even plausible - that there's a tradition of misogyny that can be traced back to ancient Greece, isn't it equally plausible that we can trace a tradition of democracy back to ancient Greece as well? And yet my sense is that the idea of Athens as the cradle of democracy is less popular among American classicists than it used be. 

I noted above that it could be that narratives of Chinese (or Greek) cultural continuity are simply more accurate than notions of 'Western Civilization.' It could be argued, for a start, that 'Western Civilisation' is a more amorphous concept than Chinese Civilization, or Greece. In fact, something along these lines often is argued; although usually this is done by simply stressing the unhandlable multi-facetedness of Western Civilization, not by bolstering a sense of the continuities in national histories. (That, in itself, somewhat gives the game away.)

My own sense is that while we shouldn't uncritically accept stories about tradition (especially ones that stretch over huge spans of time - stories about apostolic succession and dharma transmission both come to mind), we also can't simply assume that all claims about tradition are false. Most of us recognize, I think, that some sort of long-term handing down of ideas and life ways is possible. (Indeed, I would go so far as to describe it as a fairly obvious feature of human society.) 

Whether particular claims about particular traditions are true is something that is best worked out on a case-by-case basis; and I would be the first to admit that there are, for example, simplistic narratives of Western Civilization and the transmission of democracy that don't stack up when set against the messy nuances of historical fact. 

My plea here, I suppose, is simply that we engage each other on a level playing field when it comes to teasing out which aspects of which narratives are sanctioned by the evidence, and which ones aren't. We can't, I think, make sweeping deconstructionist critiques of some narratives ( 'all narratives are constructed,' 'We must take care not to reify notions of "tradition,"' and so on) while exempting others from that style of skepticism. At least, we can't if we don't want those listening into our debates concluding that we're conducting ourselves in a less than perfectly consistent, and even-handed, manner. 

Classical Americana

 

Among the many claims about the field of Classics made in the New York Times' lengthy profile of Princeton Classics professor Dan-el Padilla Peralta was that “Classics as we know it today is a creation of the 18th and 19th centuries.” As has already been pointed out, it's a claim that only holds up if we allow the phrase 'Classics as we know it today' to do a lot of work. Classics as a modern academic field within a modern, research-intensive university system may well owe its origins to the emergence of the modern research university in 19th-century Germany. But Europeans have been turning back to classical cultures of the Greeks and the Romans pretty much since Rome fell.

So much is clear from more or less every stage of European history, from the Dark Ages, when monks kept the classical literary tradition alive by copying Greek and Latin manuscripts; through the Renaissance, when humanists like Politian translated and emulated classical writings; to the Enlightenment, when, as Rachel Poser, the author of the New York Times piece, puts it, “a sort of mania” for Greece and Rome took hold of the intellectual classes. The idea Europeans simply invented the classical tradition out of whole cloth in the Renaissance is, in other words, contradicted by virtually the entire history of European culture before then.

It might be objected at this point, as a last-gasp effort to save Poser from what seems like a fairly obvious clanger, that her focus was on the United States, not Europe. 'How these two old civilizations became central to American intellectual life,' she writes (with my added emphasis) 'is a story that begins not in antiquity, and not even in the Renaissance, but in the Enlightenment.' So perhaps her hypothesis isn't that a relationship with Greco-Roman culture became central to European culture only in the 18th and 19th centuries (after all, that's plainly wrong); but simply that Greece and Rome only became big in American culture during the Enlightenment. 

Now, that's obviously true, but it's true for what should have been a fairly obvious reason. Greco-Roman culture only becomes baked into American culture and institutions during the Enlightenment because that's when the United States developed into an independent nation. In other words, there was no United States of America before 1789, and there weren't even any permanent Anglo settlements in North America until 1607. Depending on where precisely you place the Enlightenment, that makes it inevitable that the Greek and Roman classics won't have a big presence in American life before then.

But still, wouldn't the kind of engagement with Greek and Roman history that is on show in the Federalist Papers have been impossible without the Enlightenment? When colonial Americans did wrestle with the Greco-Romans, didn't they always do so in an Enlightenment vein? Well, no. According to Eric Adler, Greek and Latin formed a large part of the curricula of the colonial colleges. And they were taught in a way that reflected two traditions, humanism and scholasticism, that stretch back well before the Enlightenment. 

They were, in fact, taught largely in a Christian vein. This brings us to a fact about Western cultural history that's so obvious that we are, it would seem, no longer capable of seeing it. The Europeans that settled North America in the Early Modern period were, almost to a man, Christians; and Christianity is a religion with roots in the ancient Mediterranean world. When the British settled North America, their religious and educational elites brought the study of Greek and Latin with them in large part because many of their holy texts (the Gospels; influential translations like the Septuagint and Jerome's Vulgate; the works of the Church Fathers) were written in those languages.

We can, as it happens, actually test the thesis that, had Europeans come to the Americas before the Enlightenment, they would have brought an interest in the Greco-Roman classics with them. We can do this because, as you might be aware, Europeans (mainly Spanish and Portuguese) did actually arrive in the Americas well before anyone's starting-point for the Enlightenment. And, sure enough, if we look at Spanish accounts of their encounters with local people, we find references to Greek and Roman historiography. Many of these accounts were, of course, written by priests of the Christian religion, a religion which, it bears repeating, was a central part of the Europeans' cultural inheritance and which has its origins in the Greco-Roman world. 

The real reason that Greece and Rome play such a significant role in the culture of the nascent United States, then, should be fairly obvious. Early Americans (at least the educated ones) talked about Greece and Rome because they came from Europe, and European culture was rooted in the Greco-Roman past. European settlers in the Americas, from Quebec to Buenos Aires, brought European culture with them, and European culture had a significant classical component. The specifically Enlightenment style of classicising engaged in by men like Georgia founder James Oglethorpe, whose utopian schemes were influenced by Plato, was simply the latest wave of classical influence. That it involved engagement with the classics was, in itself, more of a continuation of pre-existing European cultural habits than anything fundamentally novel.

All of this should, to repeat, be fairly obvious to anyone who knows anything about global cultural history. But the power of the ideology that currently has a stranglehold on US colleges is considerable; so considerable, in fact, that it leads college professors to write statements that any layman can see are plainly false. For Rebecca Futo Kennedy, for example, of Denison College, Ohio, modern Americans ‘are no more or no less the heirs of the ancient Greeks than they are the heirs of ancient China.' 

In fact, Americans are clearly more indebted to ancient Greece than they are to ancient China. Their monumental architecture is Hellenizing in style; banks and state capitols look vaguely like the Parthenon, not the Foguang Temple. Modern Americans' political system was created by men who drew on and discussed Polybius and Plutarch, not Confucius and Shang Yang. The higher registers of their main language, English, is full of borrowings from Greek, not Mandarin. And the holiest text of the dominant religion (the New Testament, Christianity) is written in koine Greek, not Old Chinese.  

Once again, virtually everyone who hasn't spent too much time around a modern American Humanities department knows this, and knows why this is the case. Americans are more indebted to ancient Greece than to ancient China because the United States was created largely by Europeans; and European culture, for stunningly obvious reasons, has always been more indebted to ancient Greece than to ancient China. 

But this simple fact destroys one of the central contentions of the extreme 'social justice' approach to Classics profiled in Poser's New York Times piece. This contention, as Poser describes it, is that ideas about the classical tradition 'cannot be separated from the discourses of nationalism, colorism and progress that were taking shape during the modern colonial period, as Europeans came into contact with other peoples and their traditions.' 'Enlightenment thinkers created a hierarchy with Greece and Rome, coded as white, on top, and everything else below,' she goes on. And she quotes Harvard professor Paul Kosmin: 'That exclusion,' he tells her 'was at the heart of Classics as a project.'

This is wrong-headed in any number of ways. For a start, as the cognitive scientist Steven Pinker has had to remind historians, the idea that exclusion, inter-group violence, and slavery was a product of the Enlightenment gets things exactly the wrong way round. One of the things that most clearly distinguishes Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment cultures is precisely their relative inclusivity and pacifism, not to mention their distaste for slavery, an eccentricity that in itself sets them apart from virtually all previous civilisations. 

But the simplest way we can see that the radical revisionist view is wrong is by going back to the obvious facts about Western cultural history that I've referred to in this post. The new would-be orthodoxy is that the classical tradition 'cannot be separated' from ideas that took shape in the modern colonial period. In fact it can, as a simple glance at the classical tradition before the modern colonial period makes clear. 

Dropping the past

 

Stephen Jones recently put out his list of the best rugby union teams of all time. Like a lot of these 'best of' lists, it doesn't seem to be based on much more than Jones' impressions and memories. His list doesn't go back further than the 1970s. Can we do better?

To start with we'll need to think about what we mean by 'the best.' Does that mean the 'with the best record'? In that case we'll need to bear in mind how much teams played - winning 15 matches in a year is harder than winning 5. Do we mean 'the best relative to contemporary rivals?' If so we'll want to have a sense of how strong the teams of various different eras were. Or do we just mean 'the best at rugby'? The problem with that approach is that it's no fun, since the pro teams of today would clearly have destroyed the amateur sides of yesteryear. 

And anyway, rugby teams play against other teams around at the same time, not against teams from 50 years ago. Supremacy in the present is the name of the game. So let's go with 'best relative to their contemporary rivals.' Note that if we're really focused on who's the best - as in, most likely to win - we'll have to be disciplined and not care so much about who has the most iconic players, who won the most memorable series, who had the most positive cultural impact, etc. Those things might be more important in saying which teams were the greatest, but not so much which were the best.

The next thing to think about is what we mean by a 'team.' Teams change over time. There's probably some form of fancy analysis that could be done tracking the similarity of teams over time, but I don't know how to do it. And some teams are clearly more stable than others. Touring teams and tournament sides probably produce the most similar lineups, since they're drawn from a squad that's brought together for a particular period of time. 

So, for what it's worth, here's my list. 

1. New Zealand 2011-17. An 100% record in tests in 2013, 17 consecutive victories up to June 2014, 1st place in the Rugby Championship six times, plus a couple of World Cups. Thrashed the Springboks 57-0 in 2017.

2. South Africa 1949-52. Won test series against All Blacks 4-0, and then went on their own tour of the five nations, beating them all (including Scotland 44-0) and losing only 1 of their 31 matches overall. 

3. New Zealand 1905-6, the original All Blacks. Toured Britain, France, and North America winning 35 out of 36, scoring 976 points and conceding 59. 

4. England 2002-3. They didn't win the 2002 Six Nations, but won the Grand Slam in 2003. Beat the Springboks 53-3 at home and the Wallabies and All Blacks both home and away. Beat Australia again in the final to take the World Cup.

5. The 1924-25 All Blacks, dubbed The Invincibles' after winning all of their 32 matches (including one against each of the home nations). Points for: 838. Against: 116.

6. The 1937 Springboks, also dubbed 'The Invincibles,' slightly less deservingly, after suffering only two losses on a 29-match tour of Australia and New Zealand. 

7. New Zealand in the late 60s. A series victory against the Springboks in 1965 kickstarted a 17-match winning streak that was ended only in 1969 by Wales. 

8. South Africa 1995-1998. After the World Cup victory they lost a test series at home to the All Blacks for the first time in 1996, but they then swept the Tri-Nations in 1998, winning 17 consecutive matches. 
 
9. Australia 1999-2001. Two Tri-Nations victories following on from the 1999 World Cup. 

10. Wales in the 70s. Won 7 Five Nations championships including 3 Grand Slams. Lost both tests against NZ in 1969, and could only draw against South Africa the following year. Lost to NZ again in 1978. Formed the core of the British Lion team that won the test series in NZ in 1971.

Bow, wow

My first Greek teacher at school was one of those wizened, old-school schoolmasters they don't seem to make anymore. He was a deeply civilized man - he played the cello and the piano to concert standard as well as being able to talk more entertainingly about Cicero (an advanced skill in itself). He was usually kindly and often humorous, but he also had a stern side. I remember him leaning over my friend (who had just farted in class), his face inches away, pronouncing, very distinctly, 'Let nothing get in the way of learning!' It was rumoured he'd been in the SAS. When we got too rowdy supporting the First XV he would simply walk along the touchline and we'd all go quiet.

It was the same walk as he had in chapel. Somehow he was always the last one in, though I don't think that was an official role. We'd all be fidgeting, gossiping, poking each other with compasses, that sort of thing. He would walk down the aisle, his clipping shoes sealing up the silence behind him like he was zipping up the door of a tent. And when he got to the end, he would bow his head to the altar.

It was interesting to me partly because he was usually so upright. Later I encountered the same oscillation between bowing and upright posture at the San Francisco Zen Centre. It took me years of experience with different Buddhist groups before I could put aside my distaste for bowing to Buddha statues. Whether it was a Western egalitarianism or a Protestant distaste for idols, I didn't like it. Part of me still doesn't. And - something it's taken me years to admit to myself - part of me does.

The rationale for the formal postures they have at Western Zen centres tends to focus on mindfulness. Bowing and then standing upright and so on at different times certainly does require a certain alertness, but there's also something else going on. Shunryu Suzuki, the founder of the SF centre, apparently tripled the number of bows there because he thought Westerners needed to 'get their heads down.' The Tibetans who do full protestations have a phrase about that practice as a way to 'turn the cup upside down.' Bowing is, in other words, a way of practising and cultivating humility.

But it can also go deeper. Pack animals that have clear hierarchies in the wild - dogs, for example - seem to feel more secure in the presence of a undisputed top dog (a role human owners have stepped into). We may have something of this in ourselves. Bowing to Christ or the Buddha may be as much about handing over responsibility to them as anything else. And surrendering responsibility over ourselves is something we seem to find strangely comforting. There's something of this in the erotic sphere too, with a whole subculture of people who enjoy putting themselves in subordinate positions. Kneeling as part of oral sex and as part of religious ritual may not be as far apart as we like to think (a similarity that's been noted by generations of poets).

An increase in humility in one person is often accompanied by a growth in pride somewhere else, though, and humility can sit dangerously close to humiliation. That's what used to give me the willies about bowing, and still does occasionally. The Kings of Persia used to demand a full prostration from their vassals, something the Greeks called proskynesis. (Earlier, Kings of Assyria had required the same form of obeisance; below is the black obelisk of Shalmeneser III, who is standing over the defeated Jehu of Israel). When Alexander the Great started demanding similar treatment, his Greek and Macedonian peers took it as a sign of a slide towards tyranny. Forcing people into head-down positions and onto the ground can be elements of torture, featured from medieval heresy trials to the prisons at Abu Ghraib.

The former San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick's ritual of 'taking a knee' in protest against perceived injustice has now been more widely adopted as part of the 'Black Lives Matter' movement. The posture is uncannily similar to the way Catholics genuflect to the altar. That, of course, isn't necessarily to the discredit either of the protests or of Catholicism. As we've seen, bowing clearly has deep roots in human psychology as an expression of devotion. It's a central part of the human palette of gestures, as much as hugging someone or jumping for joy.

As the same time, given its potential for abuse it's easy to see why some (like the UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab) have refused to take a knee, seeing it as a symbol of submission. That it clearly is, though perhaps what's really going on in such cases isn't a distaste for submission in any context, but simply for submission to that particular cause (and Raab did indicate that he would bend the knee for the Queen). My old Greek master bowed to his idea of God, but apparently not for much else. This might be part of the point of religious types of bowing, to find a way of satisfying the human urge for submission in a way that nonetheless preserves our independence. Whether that works out in practice will depend partly on your idea of God.

Others will particularize their acts of submission, holding their heads up high in everyday life while choosing not to in certain contexts. But it might make sense to always remain a little on guard wherever we choose to bow our heads. I know it's possible to get too hung up on this; after all, bowing is a very common way simply of greeting other people across the Far East. But when it comes to more ritualized bowing, the kind of bowing that turns your heart upside down, it might be worth choosing your masters wisely. Be careful, in other words, what you bow to.

Is Theodor Fontane the German Hardy?

Again, I don't know enough to say. I did just read Unterm Birnbaum (Under the Pear Tree) and there were things about it that reminded me of Hardy - the strong sense of place, the use of local dialect, the pastoral setting combined with some very dark themes. The prose is deceptively simple, also, I think, like Hardy's. There's also the fact that Hardy and Fontane both seem to be in that rarefied set of writers who've achieved greatness both as poets and novelists. And that both touched on topics that were seen as 'inappropriate' by the society of the time.

Fontane seems most well-known in the German-speaking world for his ballad 'John Maynard' about a steamship captain on Lake Erie whose ship caught fire but who stayed with it and steered it to shore. Bizarrely to my mind, the repeated, 'Und noch ---- Minuten bis Buffalo!' ('And ----- minutes more to Buffalo!) has apparently been etched into the memory of generations of German school children. It is an exciting poem. The rest of Fontane's ballads read as very alien nowadays, even (or maybe especially) the 'English-Scottish' ones.

Fontane's lyric poetry, though, is straightforward, lucid, and, I would say, moving. (In the first two of these qualities his lyric poems are different to Hardy's.) I just wanted to post a couple here. The beauty is all in the simplicity - a simplicity which is, again, often a slightly deceptive one.

Der erste Schnee.

Die Sonne schien, doch Winters Näh’
     Verrieth ein Flockenpaar;
Es gleicht das erste Flöckchen Schnee
     Dem ersten weißen Haar.

5

Noch wird – wie wohl von lieber Hand

     Der erste Schnee dem Haupt –
So auch der erste Schnee dem Land
     Vom Sonnenstrahl geraubt.

[6]

Doch habet Acht! mit einem Mal

10

     Ist Haupt und Erde weiß,

Und Freundeshand und Sonnenstrahl
     Sich nicht zu helfen weiß.

I don't have any great grasp of German poetry, but the simplicity, the 'naive' joy in nature, and the bittersweetness of the ending - the sense that certain kinds of longing are inevitable - reminds me of nothing so much of Wilhelm Müller's Winterreise, as famously set to music by Schubert. All these notes - simplicity, an intimacy with nature, and, finally, of the inevitability of life's joys passing - all that is even stronger here:

In der Krankheit.

(Brief an E.)

     Mein ganzes Zimmer riecht nach Wald,
Das machen die kiehnenen Tische,
Glaub mir, ich muß genesen bald
In dieser Harzesfrische.

5

     Du bist noch kaum bei uns daheim

An unsres Kindes Bettchen,
Und sieh, schon sitzt ein muntrer Reim
Auf meinem Fensterbrettchen.

     Er sitzt allda und schaut mich an

10

Wie auf dem Felde die Lerchen

Und singt: „Du hast ganz wohlgethan,
Dich still hier einzupferchen.

[21]

     „Steh nur früh auf und schweif umher

Und lache wie der Morgen,

15

So wird dies grüne Waldesmeer

Schon weiter für Dich sorgen.

     „Und schied’st Du doch zu dieser Frist,
So tu es ohne Trauern,
Das Leben, weil so schön es ist,

20

Kann es nicht ewig dauern.“

Accomplished accomplices

The other day I went on a day-trip to the city of Augsburg, just outside of Munich. It's well worth a visit: for centuries an autonomous city-state within the Holy Roman Empire, it's a very pleasant place to wander around, and has, besides, a number of interesting things to see. There's the cathedral (with an excellent museum attached to it), the Golden Hall (which richly deserves its name) in the Town Hall, and the Fuggerei, one of the world's earliest experiments of social housing, set up by the Fuggers, the Silicon Valley billionaires of their day. (Rent was set at one Rhenish Guilder back in the 16th century, and you can still live there for €0.88 a year - all you have to do is say a few prayers each day for the souls of the Fugger family). 

Just down the river from the Fuggerei, another extraordinary encouragement to prayer was being constructed around the same time. These are the three enormous late Gothic/early Baroque altars set up in the church of local saints Ulrich and Afra. (There are actually two churches - one Protestant and one Catholic - in what used to be an independent monastic complex. The ornate altars I'm talking about are obviously in the Catholic one.) These are the work of the Bavarian master Hans Degler, and you can get a sense of them in the picture above. Only a sense, though - I couldn't really find any photos online that succeeded in reproducing the effect of entering the church with the light falling in late winter, and seeing these enormous, shadowy structures looming at the far end of the nave. 

What's so wondrous about them isn't only their hugeness, but also the proliferation of figures crowded into them and hanging off them, like on an Indian commuter train (or, indeed, a Hindu temple). The southern altar (on the right) shows Christ rising from the dead (apparently with a Swiss flag), with Augustine on one side of him and Ambrosius on the left. The northern altar (on the left) is dedicated to the Holy Spirit possessing the Apostles at Pentecost (fifty days, as the Greek term suggests, after the resurrection). It's also dedicated to St. Afra, and shows her martyrdom, in the presence of Saints Ursula, Catherine of Alexandria, Barbara and Cecilia. 

Finally, there's the high altar, in the middle of the picture above, marked with a cross. (Of course, all of the altars are high, but this one earns its name with five stories, one more than the others have.) At the centre of this one is the familiar scene of Jesus' birth in Bethlehem. One story above him, his mother is being crowned, with Peter and Paul the paid bouncers beside her. 

And that's only a pathetically quick description of some of the main figures. I've left out Gregory and Jerome (Fathers of the Church); Saints Rochus and Sebastian; and Mary as Queen of the Martyrs, among many others. And as a matter of fact, it's this super-abundance of focal points that got me thinking on the forty-minute train trip back to Munich. As a good non-theist with an interest (both senses) in meditative techniques, I've been praying the Hail Mary, you see, and one of the things that popped into my mind was the Marian motto 'to Jesus through Mary.' 

Another thing that I was reminded of after staring at those altars was the 'refuge tree' I'd encountered at Diamond Way Buddhist centres. Again the proliferation of figures, deities and semi-deities, Buddhas male and female, young and old, green and blue and white. 

One question that might occur to us when looking at such things is why a monotheistic religion needs them - not to mention a religion which, technically, isn't focused on a divinity at all. If the point is God/Jesus, what's the point of contemplating the saints? And if the point is awakening, or (at a pinch) the Buddha as a guide to awakening, why the profusion of spinning green houris? 

One idea I had is that omething like the following might be going on. As we're always being told (by science as much as religion) the human mind is weak and easily distracted. Because of that, even the simple techniques that have grown up with the idea of calming or strengthening it are quite hard to do - at least, they're hard to do with any degree of success (if by success you mean succeeding on focusing on something without your mind wandering). If you sit someone down in front of a crucifix or a Buddha, chances are their mind will wander to the closest new thing it comes across.

Why not, then, make sure the closest things it comes across guides it back to the meditation object? You could just put up more Jesus or Buddha statues (it's been tried), but the mind would probably just reject all of them in one go. But a saint or a minor Buddha that reminds you of a story involving the Anointed or Enlightened One - that's just the right amount of difference to catch the attention and draw it back. Maybe this is part of how the rosary works - by stringing us along with talk of Mary until we're subtly roped back into God through the changeable tags at the ends of the phrases (which usually tie in Jesus).

I don't know if there's been any scientific work or whether this is how these things really work in the minds of Catholics or Buddhists who dedicate themselves to the these practices. I also don't know of any very explicit passages in the writings of these religions which state that this is what's going on (or should be going on). If you know of any, please let me know in the comments below. If I've lost you at this point but you're still haunted by those altars I was describing before your mind wandered, I'd definitely recommend getting on a train from Munich and being haunted by them again up close.